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Clarifying Appellate Standards Of Review: Why Rule 19(b) Is A Mixed Question Of Law And 
Fact That Requires Abuse Of Discretion Review* 
 
I. Introduction 
The United States Courts of Appeals are currently split regarding the appropriate standard 
of appellate review for a district court’s decision relating to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b).1  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 concerns the required joinder of parties.2  Rule 19(a) is used to 
determine persons required to be joined if feasible.3  Rule 19(b) is applied when joinder of those 
parties from Rule 19(a) is not feasible.4  Rule 19(b) requires that if a Rule 19(a) party cannot be 
joined, the court must “determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should 
proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.”5   
The Second Circuit in Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby6 recently noted the circuit split that 
was first recognized in 2000.7  Although the court in Marvel had no occasion to review a Rule 
19(b) determination,8 the United States Supreme Court in Philippines v. Pimentel9 did, but it 
elected to wait to determine the appropriate standard of appellate review.10   In Pimentel, the district 
court’s decision required reversal under either abuse of discretion review or de novo review since 
a court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”11  The only guidance 
                                                          
* Daniel G. Worley, Jr., J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; Pharm.D. magna cum laude, 
2012, Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy at Rutgers University. 
1 Only the Sixth Circuit applies de novo review.  The Seventh Circuit has not yet articulated a standard of review.  
All other circuits apply abuse of discretion review, as discussed in Part III. 
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. 
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). 
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 
5 Id. 
6 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, No. 11-3333-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16396, at *25 n.3 (2d Cir. Aug 8, 2013). 
7 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid of S.C., 210 F.3d 246, 250 n.7 (4th Cir. 2000). 
8 Marvel, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16396, at *25 (noting that the district court mistakenly concluded that it had 
personal jurisdiction over the appellants). 
9 Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 864 (2008).  
10 Id. (holding that determination of the appropriate standard did not need to be decided because errors requiring 
reversal were implicit in the district court’s rulings and explicit in the court of appeals’ opinion). 
11 Id. (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99–100 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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from Pimentel is that the “in equity and good conscience” language in Rule 19(b) implies some 
degree of deference to the district court’s findings.12   
In making a Rule 19(b) determination, a court may consider four factors.13  While these 
factors may guide the analysis, they are nonexclusive.14  Rule 19(b) is a mixed question of law and 
fact since it involves the application of an objective standard to a set of facts.15  The correct level 
of appellate review for mixed questions of law and fact has often led to confusion amongst the 
courts.  Since Rule 19(b) is a mixed question of law and fact involving a legal conclusion drawn 
from a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure concerned with the supervision of litigation, it warrants 
abuse of discretion review. 
Part II of this Comment examines the importance of appellate standards of review, both 
from the appellate practitioner’s perspective, as well as the court’s perspective.  Part II also gives 
an overview of mixed questions of law and fact and the main appellate standards of review.  Part 
III provides a detailed analysis of the current landscape of the appellate review of Rule 19(b) and 
explains why Rule 19(b) is a mixed question of law and fact.  Part IV argues that a Rule 19(b) 
determination is a legal conclusion drawn from a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure concerned with 
the supervision of litigation, which warrants abuse of discretion review.  This argument is based 
on an analysis of cases that have applied abuse of discretion review to other legal conclusions 
drawn from mixed questions of law and fact concerning other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 
legal doctrines concerned with the supervision and management of litigation.  Part V concludes 
                                                          
12 Id. 
13 The four factors are: (1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice that 
person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective 
provisions in the judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the 
person’s absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were 
dismissed for nonjoinder.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 
14 Pimentel, 553 U.S. at 862. 
15 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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this Comment by arguing that the United States Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split and 
begin to clarify the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact. 
 
II. Overview of Appellate Standards of Review 
A. The Importance of the Standards of Review 
Appellate standards of review deserve the same consideration as the merits of the case.16  
Unfortunately, however, their importance is often ignored by practicing attorneys and judges.17 
The appellant would be best served if the appellate court gives little or no deference to the lower 
court; whereas, the appellee would want a highly deferential standard of review.  The appellant’s 
likelihood of success is diminished if the appellate court were to apply a deferential review such 
as abuse of discretion, but if the appellate court applies no deference, known as de novo review, 
the appellant’s likelihood of success is much higher.  Thus, an appellant should attempt to persuade 
the appellate court to apply a less deferential standard of review. 
Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that both the appellant’s brief 
and the appellee’s brief contain “a concise statement of the applicable standard of review.”18  
Deferential review of factual findings restricts arguments to “analysis of evidence and inferences 
in support of the final findings made by the factfinder and require the appellant to demonstrate that 
the findings cannot be correct.”19  Prejudicial or plain error review calls for arguments “analyzing 
the application of law to the facts to show that proper application of the law would have resulted 
                                                          
16 See W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 865, 867–68 (1990) 
(“Because the appropriate standard of review will control the outcome of an appeal, appellate practitioners must 
consider the standard of review with the same thoughtful consideration that they give to the facts and the substantive 
law.”). 
17 Michael R. Bosse, Standards of Review: The Meaning of Words, 49 ME. L. REV. 367, 368 (1997). 
18 Fed. R. App. P. 28. 
19 19-206. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 206.01 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.).  
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in a different outcome.”20  The abuse of discretion standard “demands analysis of the facts and law 
to see whether the court or agency overlooked the clear significance of the facts or misapplied the 
law or had the power to make the ruling.”21  De novo review “requires a legal analysis and 
argument”22 because under de novo review, the appellate court may give no deference to the district 
court’s findings.23  An argument on appeal “based on an incorrect standard of review must fail.”24  
As illustrated, a clear standard on appeal is crucial to successful litigation. 
The concept of appellate standards of review did not become “firmly rooted” in judicial 
opinions until the end of the twentieth century.25  Both the bench and the bar will benefit from a 
clear explanation of not only “what” the appropriate standard of review is, but “why” that particular 
standard is appropriate.26  A clear standard of review would allow appellate lawyers to more 
accurately predict how their issues would be treated on appeal.27  It would also benefit appellate 
judges in assessing the merits of an appeal.28  Failure to properly address the standard of review 
leads to “an inconsistent and unreliable body of law.”29  In addition to the development of a 
consistent body of law and the increased ability to predict success on appeal, standards of review 
also “balance the power among the courts” and “enhance judicial economy.”30   
 
 
                                                          
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 19-206. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 206.04 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.). 
24 19-206. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 206.01 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.). 
25 Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 237 
(2009) (citing G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2005)). 
26 Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review – Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 231, 231 (1991).  
27 See Id. at 250–51. 
28 Id. 
29 Peters, supra note 25, at 235. 
30 Id. at 238.  
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B. Standards of Appellate Review: Is It A Question of Law, Question of Fact, Or Mixed 
Question of Law and Fact? 
 
The different standards of appellate review provide for “how ‘wrong’ the lower court has 
to be before it will be reversed.”31  The appellate standard of review is determined by the court’s 
interpretation of the issue as one of law or fact.32  A question of law has been defined as “[a]n  
issue to be decided by the judge, concerning the application or interpretation of the law.”33  A 
question of fact has been defined as “an issue that has not been predetermined and authoritatively 
answered by the law.”34 
In practice, however, “the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact 
from questions of law has been to say the least, elusive.”35  One scholar has noted, “at first blush, 
this distinction might seem self-evident, yet commentators have disputed for decades the 
boundaries of each, and noted their ‘delusive simplicity.’”36  Another scholar has observed that 
“the debate on what constitutes an issue of fact and what constitutes an issue of law has been going 
on in this country for over a century.”37   
When the line between a question of law and a question of fact began to blur, hybrid 
standards such as “mixed question of law and fact” and “application of law to facts” emerged and 
soon became problematic.38  The appropriate standard to be applied to the hybrid “mixed question 
                                                          
31 MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 14 (3d ed. 2010). 
32 Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11, 21 (1994). 
33 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1366 (9th ed. 2009). 
34 Id.   
35 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985).   
36 Hofer, supra note 26, at 235 n.17 (1991) (citing Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1922)).   
37 Kunsch, supra note 32. 
38 Id. at 22. 
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of law and fact” has historically been a point of debate among legal scholars.39  There is still no 
consensus among legal scholars. 
The Supreme Court has described a mixed question of law and fact as an issue that 
“requires application of an objective legal standard to the facts.”40  The Court noted that the 
standard of review is often not determined by an explicit statutory command, but is provided “by 
a long history of appellate practice.”41  In the absence of such a statutory command or history of 
appellate practice, the Supreme Court has noted that “it is uncommonly difficult to derive from the 
pattern of appellate review of other questions an analytical framework that will yield the correct 
answer.”42   
The appropriate standard of appellate review for mixed questions of law and fact has 
created several circuit splits that have already been resolved by the Supreme Court.43  The Court 
continues to decide the standard of review for mixed questions on an ad hoc basis.44  Practical and 
policy considerations often guide appellate courts in determining standards of review for mixed 
questions of law and fact.45  Two major practical considerations include the expertise of the district 
                                                          
39 Hofer, supra note 26, at 243 (comparing J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise of Evidence At The Common Law 191 
(1898) (mixed questions should be treated as questions of fact), with O. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 236 (1920) 
(mixed questions should be treated as questions of law)). 
40 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
41 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988). 
42 Id. 
43  See e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001) (holding that an award of 
punitive damages should be reviewed de novo to assure compliance with Due Process); Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690 
(holding that questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause for a warrantless search should be given de novo 
review); Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (holding that a district court’s determination of 
state law should be reviewed de novo); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399 (1990) (holding that a 
district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion); Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558 
(holding that a district court’s determination of whether the Government’s position was “substantially justified” 
warranted abuse of discretion review); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (holding that a state court’s 
determination of  voluntariness of confession should be reviewed de novo). 
44 19-206. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 206.04 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.). 
45 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting); See Kunsch, supra note 32, at 23; Bosse, supra note 17, at 397.   
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court and the law-clarifying value of probing appellate scrutiny.46  One major policy consideration 
is whether constitutional rights are implicated, if so, de novo review may be favored.47 
Some United States Supreme Court cases have applied de novo review to mixed questions 
of law and fact.48  In advancing a rule for de novo review of mixed questions of law and fact, the 
majority in Ornelas v. United States reasoned that fact patterns may occasionally repeat 
themselves.49  Even in cases that purport to apply de novo review due to constitutional 
considerations, an appellate court may give deference to inferences made at trial.50  The Supreme 
Court has also applied abuse of discretion review to mixed questions of law and fact “when it 
appears that the [district] court is ‘better positioned’ to decide the issue in question or that probing 
appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.”51   
Rule 19(b) determinations are mixed questions of law and fact that should be reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  The district court has more expertise over the factual 
considerations, and appellate review will not clarify the law.  Additionally, Rule 19(b) 
determinations are not the type of fact patterns that the Ornelas Court would have deemed likely 
                                                          
46 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
47 MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 15 (3d ed. 2010). 
48 When dealing with mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues, the court justifies de novo 
review to unify precedent and stabilize legal principles.  See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275-76 (2002) 
(reasonable suspicion under the 4th Amendment); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 
(2001) (review of punitive damages award to comport with Due Process);  Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 691 (1996) 
(reasonable suspicion and probable cause under the 4th Amendment); Miller, 474 U.S. at 112 (certain interrogation 
techniques are condemned by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Cuyler v.Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 
(1980) (right to effective counsel under the 6th Amendment); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–74 
(1944) (constitutional rights as a naturalized citizen).   
49 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 698. 
50 See id. at 699 (“[A] reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error 
and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement 
officers.”); Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. 
51 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); see Ornelas, 517 U.S. 
at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “expertise of the district court and lack of law-clarifying value in the 
appellate decision” are the “primary factors” that weigh in favor of deferential review of mixed questions of law and 
fact.). 
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to repeat themselves because they are so fact-intensive.52  The Supreme Court in Pimentel noted 
that a Rule 19(b) decision is a “case-specific inquiry.”53  The district judge is in a better position 
to apply the objective legal standard to the facts of each unique case for Rule 19(b) determinations.   
Until the Supreme Court makes a ruling on the appropriate standard, the courts of appeals 
will continue to follow their own precedent in reviewing a district court’s Rule 19(b) 
determination.  The following subsections explain in detail the three traditional appellate standards 
of review, as well as the policy considerations behind them.  Understanding the differences 
between the various standards of review further clarifies why a Rule 19(b) determination warrants 
abuse of discretion review.   
i. De Novo Standard of Review 
De novo review is also known as “plenary” or “independent” review.54  Under de novo 
review, the district court’s conclusions may be given no deference by the appellate court.55  The 
appellate court is allowed to make its own decision as to the correct application of the law using 
the evidence and findings of fact from the district court.56  The Supreme Court has said that a 
reviewing court is performing de novo review when it “makes an original appraisal of all the 
evidence to decide whether or not it believes [the conclusions reached by the district court].”57  
Questions of law warrant de novo review.58   
                                                          
52 See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that fact-intensive issues such as probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion are “fluid concepts,” which are not determined by a set formula are not likely to repeat 
themselves). 
53 Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 864 (2008). 
54 19-206. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 206.04 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 (1984).   
58 19-206. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 206.04 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.). 
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De novo review of purely legal issues “best serves the dual goals of doctrinal coherence 
and economy of judicial administration.”59  This goal is particularly important when an appellate 
court reviews constitutional issues.60  Institutional competence is a major consideration in 
determining the appropriate level of deference that is to be given to a district court’s 
determination.61  District courts necessarily focus their energy and resources towards hearing 
witnesses and reviewing evidence.62  Logistical burdens “limit the extent to which trial counsel is 
able to supplement the district judge’s legal research with memoranda and briefs.”63  Appellate 
judges have the benefit of a developed record, which allows them to “devote their primary attention 
to legal issues.”64  Since the appellate courts are directed toward resolving questions of law, the 
parties’ briefs will be refined to provide more comprehensive information and analysis that were 
not provided for the district court.65   
In addition to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional 
considerations, issues involving complex analysis of the law might benefit from the uniformity 
that review from a non-deferential appellate court can provide.   For these types of issues, de novo 
review is the best way to achieve uniformity within a jurisdiction.  Uniform development of the 
law is important for people to understand the boundaries of the law.  The Supreme Court should 
maintain its commitment to de novo review for questions of law and explicitly adopt the de novo 
standard for mixed questions of law and fact relating to constitutional issues. 
                                                          
59 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell. 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).   
60 MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 15 (3d ed. 2010). 
61 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001) (holding that an appellate court is better 
positioned to evaluate a punitive damages award for consistency with due process). 
62 Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 231.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 232. 
65 Id. 
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While de novo review may enhance uniformity with respect to purely legal questions, “fact-
bound resolutions cannot be made uniform through appellate review, de novo or otherwise.”66  It 
would be “unwise” to require courts of appeals to review mixed questions of law and fact that are 
fact-bound in nature under de novo review.67  Reviewing fact-specific determinations may 
“‘strangely distort the appellate process’ by establishing circuit law in ‘a most peculiar, second-
handed fashion.’”68  The following subsections will give further detail as to why issues involving 
facts or the application of an objective standard of law to the facts do not benefit from de novo 
review.   
ii. Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review 
The abuse of discretion standard is “deferential to the district court’s familiarity with the 
proceedings and evidence in the case.”69  Abuse of discretion review has been applied to mixed 
questions of law and fact involving “legal conclusions”70 drawn from a district court’s analysis of 
a “procedural device”71 or issues concerning supervision of litigation.72  The appropriate level of 
review for such questions that involve the weighing and balancing of contending factors is “likely 
to be close,” but a district judge is in the best position to “explore all the facets of a case;” therefore, 
a district judge’s assessment merits substantial deference on review.73 
The Supreme Court has not articulated a test to determine whether a district court has 
abused its discretion;74 however, many circuits have developed their own standards.75  In abuse of 
                                                          
66 Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 1989). 
67 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
68 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561 
(1988)). 
69 19-206. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 206.05 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.). 
70 Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 401 (describing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) as a “procedural device”). 
71 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 3 (1980).  
72 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991). 
73 Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 12. 
74 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99–100 (1996). 
75 19-206. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 206.05 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.). 
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discretion review, an appellate court is “not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts but to 
make sure that the conclusions derived from those weighings and assessments [of the district court] 
are judicially sound and supported by the record.”76  An appellate court must scrutinize the district 
court’s evaluation of the facts, but the “discretionary judgment of the district court should be given 
substantial deference.”77  In an abuse of discretion review, it does not matter if the appellate court 
would have decided the matter in the same way, only that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.78   
 The deference shown to the district courts through the abuse of discretion standard “will 
streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of reweighing evidence 
and reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by the district court.”79  Similarly, the 
deference will “enhance [a district court’s] ability to control the litigants before them.”80  
Additionally, the abuse of discretion standard will discourage litigants from appealing marginal 
issues.81 
There is a long line of Supreme Court jurisprudence that supports the concept that legal 
conclusions drawn from mixed questions of law and fact concerning Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or legal doctrines concerned with the supervision and management of litigation should 
receive abuse of discretion review.82  The Supreme Court should explicitly adopt the abuse of 
discretion standard for all such mixed questions of law and fact, including Rule 19(b).  The district 
court is ideally positioned to evaluate the facts and to apply them to an objective legal standard.  If 
the appellate court were to duplicate the efforts of the district court, “it would very likely contribute 
                                                          
76 Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10.   
77 Id. 
78 NHL v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976).   
79 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Some of the cases will be discussed in Part IV. 
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only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial 
resources.”83 
iii. Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review 
The “clearly erroneous” standard of review applies to findings of fact.84  As stated in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), findings of fact “must not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous.”85  This standard “does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of 
factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court’s findings unless 
clearly erroneous.”86  When dealing with facts, applying the clearly erroneous standard versus the 
abuse of discretion standard might be a distinction without a difference.87 
The clearly erroneous standard of review respects the district court as the primary fact-
finder and mandates that the appellate court give proper deference on appeal.88  The clearly 
erroneous standard of review also “requires the appellate court to uphold any district court 
determination that falls within a broad range of permissible conclusions.”89  A finding of fact is 
clearly erroneous when the appellate court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.”90  An appellate court may not reverse the trier of fact “simply 
because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently.”91   
The Supreme Court has been very consistent in its application of the clearly erroneous 
standard to findings of fact.  Mixed questions of law and fact, such as Rule 19(b) determinations, 
                                                          
83 Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985). 
84 MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 16 (3d ed. 2010). 
85 Fed R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).   
86 Pullman-Standard, Div. of Pullman v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286 (1982). 
87 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990). (“A court of appeals would be justified in concluding 
that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual finding only if the finding were clearly 
erroneous.”). 
88 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).   
89 Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 400. 
90 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).   
91 Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 
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would benefit from a similar pronouncement that abuse of discretion review is the appropriate 
standard of review.   
 
 
 
 
III. The Current Landscape of Rule 19(b) 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 19(b) 
Rule 19(b) requires that a court determine whether an action may proceed in the absence 
of a party that it deems to be “required” under Rule 19(a).  Rule 19(b) provides four factors for the 
court to consider.92  Those factors are “to a certain extent overlapping, and they are not intended 
to exclude other considerations which may be applicable in particular situations.”93  The text of 
Rule 19(b) is as follows: 
 “Rule 19(b) Required Joinder of Parties 
 . . .  
(b)When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined if 
feasible cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and 
good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or 
should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include: 
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might 
prejudice that person or the existing parties; 
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: 
(A) protective provisions in the judgment; 
(B) shaping the relief; or 
(C) other measures; 
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate; 
and 
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were 
dismissed for nonjoinder.”94 
 
                                                          
92 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. 
93 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee’s notes (1966). 
94 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 
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 Based on the fact that Rule 19(b) requires the district court to establish facts and then apply 
them to a statutory test, Rule 19(b) is a mixed question of law and fact.  Although none of the 
circuits have explicitly evaluated Rule 19(b) as a mixed question of law and fact, the First, Second, 
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have noted that a Rule 19(b) determination involves both 
factual and legal considerations.95  The next subsections will review the United States Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on the standard of appellate review for Rule 19(b) and will also describe the 
approaches taken by the various courts of appeals. 
i. United States Supreme Court  
The United States Supreme Court has not articulated a standard of appellate review for 
Rule 19(b).96  The design of Rule 19(b) “indicates that the determination whether to proceed will 
turn upon factors that are case specific.”97  Pimentel concluded  that “the case-specific inquiry that 
must be followed in applying the standards set forth in subdivision (b), including the direction to 
consider whether ‘in equity and good conscience’ the case should proceed, implies some degree 
of deference to the district court.”98  The Pimentel Court did not decide on a standard of review 
because the lower court’s judgment could not stand due to “errors of law that require reversal.”99   
The Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson noted that a 
district court’s decision to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19 “must be based on factors varying with the 
different issues, some factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, 
and some subject to balancing against opposing interests.”100  Provident stated that both Rule 19(a) 
                                                          
95 See infra Part iv. 
96 Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 864 (2008). 
97 Id. at 862–63. 
98 Id. at 864. 
99 Id. (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99–100 (1996) (a court “by definition abuses its discretion when it 
makes an error of law.”)). 
100 Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 119 (1968). 
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and 19(b) “can only be determined in the context of a particular litigation.”101  Thus, combining 
Pimentel with Provident, a Rule 19(b) determination is a mixed question of law and fact that 
requires an appellate court to give “some degree of deference” when reviewing a district court’s 
decision. 
 
ii. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit court that applies 
de novo review to a district court’s Rule 19(b) determination.102  The Sixth Circuit in Local 670, 
United Rubber v. International Union, United Rubber “implicitly adopted the abuse of discretion 
standard for Rule 19 issues.”103  The Local 670 court implicitly adopted a de novo standard for 
Rule 19(b) when it noted that “a determination that a party is ‘indispensable,’ thereby requiring 
dismissal of an action, represents a legal conclusion reached after balancing the prescribed factors 
under Rule 19.”104  The court then said “in that sense, [a Rule 19(b) determination] becomes a 
conclusion of law which this court reviews de novo.”105 
Subsequent to Local 670 in Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Michigan106, the Sixth 
Circuit explicitly adopted the de novo standard of review for Rule 19(b).107  In adopting the de 
novo standard, the Keweenaw court noted that its “careful and limiting construction in articulating 
this standard is self-evident.”108  The Sixth Circuit continues to review 19(a) determinations under 
the de novo standard.109 
                                                          
101 Id. at 118. 
102 Glancy v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 373 F.3d 656, 665 (6th Cir. 2004). 
103 Local 670, United Rubber v. Int’l Union, United Rubber, 822 F.2d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1987). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (citing Taylor and Gaskin v. Chris-Craft Indus., 732 F.2d 1273, 1277 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
106 Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341 (6th Cir.1993). 
107 Id. at 1346. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
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iii. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit has yet to decide what standard of appellate review it should apply to 
a district court’s Rule 19(b) determination.110  The first Seventh Circuit case to address the proper 
standard of review, Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Wisconsin, declined to articulate a standard 
because the district court failed to apply any of the considerations listed in the rule and elaborated 
upon in Provident.111   Thus, the Sokaogon court would have reversed under either standard of 
review. 
Although the Sokaogon court did not articulate the appropriate standard, it noted that the 
“looseness and fact-specific nature of the inquiry that Rule 19(b) requires argue[s] for a deferential 
standard of appellate review.”112  Sokaogon also noted that Rule 19(b) might warrant a broader 
scope of review because a Rule 19(b) determination may lead to dismissal.113  Subsequently, all 
Seventh Circuit decisions have similarly declined to decide between abuse of discretion and de 
novo review because it would have reversed under either standard.114   
iv. All Other United States Courts of Appeals 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eight, 
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits apply the abuse of discretion standard 
to Rule 19(b) determinations by a district court.115  
                                                          
110 Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 568 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2009). 
111 Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1989). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Askew, 568 F.3d at 634 (legal error in analysis); Davis Co v. Emerald Casino, Inc., 268 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 
2001) (party was not necessary under Rule 19(a)); Thomas v. United States, 189 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(district court made an error in legal analysis); North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 
1998) (district court’s decision would meet either standard); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d 
476, 478 (7th Cir. 1996) (the district court’s decision would meet either standard); Wade v. Hopper, 993 F.2d 1246, 
1249 (7th Cir. 1993) (party is not indispensable); Bourne Co. v. Hunter Country Club, Inc., 990 F.2d 934, 937 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (complete relief cannot be accorded under either standard). 
115 Bacardi Int’l Ltd. v. V. Suarez & Co., 719 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 
119, 132 (2d Cir. 2013); Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist. v. Lee, 672 F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, 697 F.3d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir. 2012); Kaloe Shipping Co. Ltd. 
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The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit court to adopt an abuse of discretion standard.116  The 
Fifth Circuit relied on the pragmatic nature of Rule 19(b).117  This pragmatic approach to Rule 
19(b) “elevates the role of judgmental discretion in the joinder problem.”118  Broussard v. 
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. concluded that this discretion is due to the fact that the district 
judge is “closer to the arena and is often in a better position to survey the practicalities involved in 
the litigation.”119  The Ninth Circuit has added that the lack of a prescribed formula in such a fact-
specific determination was significant in holding that abuse of discretion is the appropriate 
standard.120  The First, Second, Fourth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have taken a 
similar approach in applying abuse of discretion review for Rule 19(b) determinations.121   
The Ninth Circuit was the first court to intimate that a Rule 19(b) determination is a mixed 
question of law and fact.122  The District of Columbia Circuit subsequently adopted the Ninth 
Circuit’s position.123  The First Circuit also noted that Rule 19(b) determinations are “anything but 
pure legal conclusions.”124  Rather, Rule 19(b) determinations “involve the balancing of competing 
                                                          
v. Goltens Serv. Co., Inc., 315 Fed.Appx. 877, 881 (11th Cir. 2009); Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 
Tenn., 570 F.3d 625, 628 (5th Cir. 2009); Huber v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 237, 247 (2d Cir. 2008); Scenic Holding, LLC 
v. New Bd. of Trs. of Tabernacle Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 506 F.3d 656, 665 (8th Cir. 2007); Am. Gen. Life 
and Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 92 (4th Cir. 2005); Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 
1489, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
116 Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 398 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1968). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1982). 
121 See Universal Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 312 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Given the 
flexible nature of Rule 19(b) analysis, we review such decisions only for an abuse of discretion.”); Nat’l Union Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid of S.C., 210 F.3d 246, 250 n.7 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that the fact-specific inquiry of Rule 19(b) 
requires abuse of discretion review); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 635 (1st Cir. 1989) (“The 
district court, which is ‘closer to the arena,’ is in the preferred position to make these decisions.”); Glenny v. Am. 
Metal Climax, Inc. 494 F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1974) (since a Rule 19(b) determination is based on specific facts 
and in light of equitable considerations, the court gives discretion to the district court). 
122 Walsh, 692 F.2d at 1242 (“[R]ule 19(b) requires the district court to analyze various equitable considerations 
within the context of particular litigation, rather than to decide a purely legal issue.”). 
123 Cloverleaf Standardbred Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., 699 F.2d 1274, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
124 Travelers, 884 F.2d at 635. 
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interests and must be steeped in ‘pragmatic considerations.’”125  Similarly, the Second Circuit 
concluded that the latitude afforded by the flexible nature of Rule 19(b) “puts a Rule 19(b) 
determination more in the arena of a factual determination than a legal one.”126 
The Third and Eighth Circuits have not yet explained their reasoning for applying abuse of 
discretion, simply stating that they apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to Rule 19(b) 
determinations made by a district court.127  The rationale underlying the Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach is also not clear.128 
The factual nature of a Rule 19(b) determination is not in dispute and neither is the fact 
that the district court is making a legal conclusion.  Surprisingly, none of the circuits have ever 
attempted to examine the issue as a mixed question of law and fact.  Next, Part IV explains why 
Rule 19(b), which is a mixed question of law and fact, warrants abuse of discretion review.  
 
IV. Legal Conclusions Drawn From Mixed Questions of Law and Fact Involving 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Other Legal Doctrines Concerned With the 
Supervision and Management of Litigation Warrant Abuse of Discretion Review 
  
A) Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.129 
 
In Cooter & Gell, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard of appellate review 
for Rule 11130 sanctions was abuse of discretion.131  In Cooter & Gell, the petitioner filed an 
antitrust claim against the respondent for an alleged “nationwide conspiracy to fix prices and to 
                                                          
125 Id. (quoting Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 119 (1968)). 
126 Envirotech Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 729 F.2d 70, 75 (2d. Cir. 1984). 
127 See State of South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1991) (first time the Eighth Circuit applied abuse 
of discretion); Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., Am. Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 
1987) (same). 
128 The Eleventh Circuit in Mann v. Albany, 883 F.2d 999, 1003 (11th Cir. 1989) was the first court in the Eleventh 
Circuit to adopt the abuse of discretion, but cited 3A MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 19.19-1 at 19-299 (1989), 
which is not commercially available. 
129 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). 
130 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
131 Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 409. 
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eliminate competition through an exclusive retail agent policy and uniform pricing scheme, as well 
as other unfair competition practices such as resale price maintenance and territorial 
restrictions.”132  Respondent then filed Rule 11 motions, contending that those allegations had no 
basis in fact.133  Petitioner subsequently filed three affidavits that set forth the findings of his 
research, which he alleged supported his allegations in the complaint.134  Petitioner’s research 
involved telephone calls to salespersons in New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and 
Washington D.C.135  From this research, petitioner inferred that “only one store in each major 
metropolitan area nationwide sold Hart, Schaffner & Marx suits.”136   
Five months after filing his complaint, petitioner filed a voluntary dismissal under Rule 
41(a)(1)(i).137 The district judge heard oral argument on the Rule 11 motion one month prior to the 
effective date of the dismissal.138  The district court subsequently granted respondent’s motion for 
Rule 11 sanctions.139  The district court held that “petitioner’s prefiling inquiry was grossly 
inadequate.”140  Specifically, it found that the complaint regarding exclusive retail agency 
arrangements “completely baseless” and that a survey of four Eastern cities was not sufficient to 
support the claim that there were exclusive retailer agreements nationwide.141 
A district court must consider three types of issues when determining whether or not an 
attorney has violated Rule 11.142  First, “the court must consider factual questions regarding the 
                                                          
132 Id.at 389. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.   
136 Id. 
137 Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 389. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 390. 
142 Id.at 399. 
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nature of the attorney’s prefiling inquiry and the factual basis of the pleading or other paper.”143 
Next, “legal issues are raised in considering whether a pleading is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for changing the law and whether the attorney’s conduct violated Rule 11.”144  
Third, “the district court must exercise its discretion to tailor an ‘appropriate sanction.’”145  The 
Court in Cooter & Gell noted that the scope of disagreement between the circuits was over 
“whether the court of appeals must defer to the district court’s legal conclusions in Rule 11 
proceedings.”146  The Court decided that the district court is “better situated than the court of 
appeals to marshall the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by 
Rule 11” because it is “more familiar with the issues and the litigants.”147   
Rule 11 is a mixed question of law and fact that requires the court to consider factual 
questions, legal issues, and then apply those findings to arrive at a conclusion, which in the case 
of Rule 11, is an appropriate sanction.  Cooter & Gell is an example of a case where the Court 
applied the abuse of discretion standard to a legal conclusion drawn from a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure concerned with the supervision and management of litigation.  Thus, Cooter & Gell 
stands in direct opposition to the Sixth Circuit’s de novo review of Rule 19(b), which also requires 
a district court to make a legal conclusion from another mixed question of law and fact concerned 
with the supervision and management of litigation. 
B) Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno148 
In Piper, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the petitioners’ 
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.  The Court held that the “forum non conveniens 
                                                          
143 Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 399. 
144 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
145 Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)). 
146 Id.at 401. 
147 Id. at 402. 
148 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
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determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”149  A district court’s forum 
determination may be reversed only when “there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”150  Although 
the Third Circuit purported to apply abuse of discretion review, it “substituted its own judgment 
for that of the District Court.”151  The Supreme Court held the district court did not abuse its 
discretion, thus affirming the district court’s decision.152   
Piper involved the crash of a small aircraft in the Scottish highlands during a charter flight, 
instantly killing the plane’s pilots and five passengers.153  Reyno, the administatrix of the estates 
of the five passengers and legal secretary of the attorney who filed the lawsuit, brought the action 
against Piper Aircraft Co. and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. in the Superior Court of California.154  The 
claim alleged negligence and strict liability.155  Reyno also filed suit in the United Kingdom against 
Air Navigation and Trading Co., Ltd., McDonald Aviation, Ltd., and the pilot’s estate.156  Reyno 
admitted to filing a separate suit against Piper and Hartzell because United States laws were more 
favorable to the decedents than Scottish laws.157   
The district court granted both Piper and Hartzell’s motions to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens based on the balancing test set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert158 and Koster v. 
                                                          
149 Id. at 257. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 259. 
153 Id. at 238–39. 
154 Piper, 454 U.S. at 239–40.  The five passengers were all Scottish residents.  Id. at 239.  Piper and Hartzell were 
the only connection to the United States.  Id.  Piper manufactured the plane in Pennsylvania.  Id.  Hartzell 
manufactured the propeller in Ohio.  Id. 
155 Id. at 240. 
156 Id.  Air Navigation and McDonald were organized in the United Kingdom.  Id.  The deceased pilot was a Scottish 
resident.  Id. 
157 Id. (Scottish law does not recognize strict liability in tort). 
158 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
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Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,159 Gilbert’s companion case.160  The Third Circuit reversed on two 
alternative grounds.161 
The balancing test from Gilbert provided a list of “private interest factors”162 and “public 
interest factors”163 to guide the district court’s discretion in a forum non conveniens inquiry.164  
The private interest factors included the accessibility to sources of proof, the availability of 
compulsory process to compel attendance of the unwilling, the cost of attendance for the willing 
witnesses, the possibility to view the premises if necessary, and all other practical problems that 
“make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. The public factors included the 
administrative difficulties associated with court congestion, the interest of local controversies 
being decided in the home state, the interest in having a trial of a diversity case in a forum that is 
“at home” with the law that governs the case, the avoidance of unnecessary problems and conflicts 
of law that are foreign to the court, and the unfairness of burdening citizens with jury duty.165   
Ordinarily, there is a “strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum.”166  
This presumption may be overcome “only when the private and public interest factors clearly point 
towards trial in the alternative forum.”167  This presumption has “less force when the plaintiff or 
real parties in interest are foreign.”168  The Supreme Court held that the district court’s evaluation 
of the private and public factors was reasonable and did not abuse its discretion.169 
                                                          
159 Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). 
160 Piper, 454 U.S. at 241. 
161 Id. at 244.  (First, the Third Circuit determined that the district court abused its discretion in the balancing test.  
Second, they held that when the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff, dismissal is automatically 
barred.). 
162 Private interest factors affect the convenience of the litigants. 
163 Public interest factors affect the convenience of the forum. 
164 Piper, 454 U.S. at 241. 
165 Id. at 430. 
166 Id. at 255. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 257–61. 
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Piper invalidates the Sixth Circuit’s position that a Rule 19(b) determination warrants de 
novo review simply because it may lead to dismissal.170  Similar to a Rule 19(b) analysis, Piper 
involved the balancing of several factors, prescribed by Gilbert, which led to the dismissal of the 
action for forum non conveniens.  Both cases require a district court to make a legal conclusion to 
dismiss a case after balancing a number of factors that are within the district court’s discretion.  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on the fact that a Rule 19(b) determination may lead to a 
dismissal of the action is misplaced. 
C) Pierce v. Underwood171 
In Pierce, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court should review an award of 
attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act172 using the abuse of discretion standard.173  
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a prevailing party other than the United States should 
receive fees and other expenses “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was 
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”174  A district court may 
also award attorney fees in excess of seventy-five dollars per hour if there is a “special factor” to 
justify a higher fee.175   
Pierce involved the decision of a former Secretary of Housing and Development to not 
implement an “operating subsidy” program authorized by the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974.176  The program was designed to offset the rising costs of utilities and 
                                                          
170 See Local 670, United Rubber v. Int’l Union, United Rubber, 822 F.2d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that Rule 
19(b), by requiring a dismissal, “represents a legal conclusion reached after balancing the prescribed factors under 
Rule 19.”). 
171 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988). 
172 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982). 
173 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559. 
174 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A) (1982). 
175 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A) (1982). 
176 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 555. 
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property taxes to owners of Government-subsidized apartment buildings.177  Several plaintiffs 
successfully challenged the Secretary’s decision to not implement that subsidy in the district 
courts.178  Subsequently, a new Secretary was appointed, and the cases were consolidated and 
settled.179   
In the present action seeking attorneys’ fees for the aforementioned cases, the district court 
granted attorney’s fees, finding that the Secretary’s decision was not “substantially justified” and 
that “special factors” justified in increased rate.180  The district court assessed a multiplier of 3.5 
to the total award due to these “special factors.”181  The Ninth Circuit applied abuse of discretion 
review and found that the Secretary’s position was not substantially justified, but it held that there 
were no special factors to justify the multiplier.182 
The Supreme Court noted that the statutory language “unless the court finds” implies 
deference, but noted that the inference is not compelled.183  More importantly, the Court relied on 
the fact that the district court is in a better position to analyze this issue.184  The Court noted that 
some aspects of the case, including whether the Government’s stance “‘was substantially justified’ 
may be known only to the district court.”185  Although the Court labeled the award of attorney’s 
fees a “purely legal issue,”186 it is more properly construed as a legal conclusion drawn from a 
mixed question of law and fact, given the factual underpinnings of the analysis.   
                                                          
177 Id. 
178 Id.   
179 Id.at 556. 
180 Id. at 557.   
181 Id. 
182 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 557. 
183 Id. at 559. 
184 Id. at 559–60.  
185 Id. at 560 (quoting 28 USC § 2412 (d)(1)(A) (1982)) (emphasis in original). 
186 Id.  
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This classification as a mixed question of law and fact is supported by the Court’s adoption 
of the abuse of discretion standard.187  Although the Court’s language was not carefully chosen, 
by the Court’s own analysis, a “purely legal question” would properly receive de novo review; 
therefore, the Court acknowledges that an award of attorney’s fees is a “matter of discretion,” 
which would receive an abuse of discretion review.  Also in support of this proposition, the Court 
notes that an inquiry into what is “substantially justified” is a multifarious and novel question 
which is based on facts that are not appropriate for generalization.188  Abuse of discretion permits 
that “needed flexibility” for such an inquiry.189 
The Court relied on precedent to determine if the district court abused its discretion in 
relation to awarding attorney’s fees and whether there was a “special factor” to justify increased 
attorney’s fees.190  The “special factors” evaluated by the district court included the limited number 
of attorneys available for these proceedings, the contingent nature of the fee, the “novelty and 
difficulty of issues, the undesirability of the case, the work and ability of counsel, and the results 
obtained.”191  The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
the United States’ position was not substantially justified, but did abuse its discretion in finding a 
“special factor” where none existed.   
Pierce strongly supports the application of the abuse of discretion standard for Rule 19(b) 
determinations.  Pierce applied abuse of discretion review to amorphous concepts such as 
“substantially justified,” “special circumstances,” and “special factors.”  Pierce reasoned that 
deference was owed to the district court’s findings because it was in a better position to make a 
                                                          
187 Id. at 561 (the Court noted that there are only three types of questions on review: (1) denominated questions of 
law, which are reviewable de novo; (2) questions of fact, which are reviewable for clear error; and (3) matters of 
discretion which are reviewable for abuse of discretion).   
188 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 562. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 571. 
191 Id. at 571–73 (internal quotations omitted). 
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determination that depended greatly on factual findings.  Similarly, Rule 19(b) requires that a 
district court interpret terms such as “adequate” and “the extent to which.”  Interpretation of such 
terms, especially in the context of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, should be reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. 
D) Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co.192 
In Curtiss-Wright v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine 
the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),193 which it termed a “procedural device.”194  Rule 
54(b) allows a district court to direct the entry of final judgment to fewer than all of the claims or 
parties if it “expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”195   
 Curtiss-Wright focused on a dispute between Curtiss-Wright Corp. and General Electric 
for the manufacturing of components for nuclear powered naval vessels.196  The total value of the 
contracts at issue was $215 million.197  Curtiss-Wright brought a diversity action alleging fraud, 
misrepresentation, and breach of contract, as well as payment of $19 million for contracts already 
performed.198  General Electric counterclaimed for costs allegedly incurred from “extraordinary 
efforts” provided to Curtiss-Wright, which enabled Curtiss-Wright to avoid default.199  This 
counterclaim was for $1.9 million.200  General Electric also counterclaimed to recover $52 million 
that Curtiss-Wright allegedly received as a result of General Electric’s “extraordinary efforts.”201  
The facts underlying most of the claims and counterclaims were in dispute, but the only dispute 
                                                          
192 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980). 
193 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
194 Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 3. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 4. 
199 Id. 
200 Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 4. 
201 Id. 
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for Curtiss-Wright’s claim for the $19 million owed concerned the application of a release clause 
stating that Curtiss-Wright agreed “as a condition precedent to final payment, that the Buyer 
[General Electric] and the Government . . . are released from all liabilities, obligations and claims 
arising under or by virtue of this order.”202  General Electric contended this clause prevented 
Curtiss-Wright from recovering as long as other claims were pending.203 
 The district court rejected General Electric’s argument and granted summary judgment for 
Curtiss-Wright with respect to the unpaid balance.204  The district court then granted Curtiss-
Wright’s motion for certification of the district court’s orders as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 
54(b).205  The district court subsequently provided a written statement supporting its decision, 
noting that such relief should not be granted as a matter of course.206  The district court considered 
the independent nature of the final judgment relative to the other claims and counterclaims 
involved, the fact that these adjudicated claims would not be mooted by future developments in 
the case, and that the claims were not the type of claims that an appellate court would have to 
review in a subsequent appeal.207 
 The district court also considered justice to the litigants in this case.208  It found that Curtiss-
Wright would suffer severe daily financial loss as a result of General Electric’s nonpayment.209  
The district court also noted the delay in payment that would result due to the complex nature of 
the remaining claims.210  The district court did not consider the solvency of both parties, which the 
                                                          
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 4–5. 
206 Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 5. 
207 Id. at 6. 
208 Id. at 6. 
209 Id. at 6. 
210 Id. at 6. 
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Third Circuit found to be significant in reversing the district court’s decision.211  The Supreme 
Court then reversed the decision of the Third Circuit, finding that the district court had not abused 
its discretion.212 
 Analysis under Rule 54(b) requires that the district court balance “judicial administrative 
interests as well as the equities involved.”213  The district court’s discretionary judgment should 
be given deference because that court is “the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with 
any justifiable reasons for delay.”214  The Supreme Court noted that the justification for giving the 
district court discretion is because “the number of possible situations is large” and that the Court 
is “reluctant to either fix or sanction narrow guidelines for district courts to follow.”215  The Court 
notes that questions that involve the weighing and balancing of contending factors is “likely to be 
close,” but that the task is “peculiarly one for the trial judge, who can explore all the facets of a 
case.”216  As such, a district judge’s determination merits substantial deference on review.217 
 Curtiss-Wright demonstrates that a conclusion drawn by a district court from a variety of 
non-specific interests and equities is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Rule 19(b) prescribes four 
factors to be considered by the district court, but that list is nonexclusive.  Thus, a district court 
may focus on factors that were not enumerated in Rule 19(b) and its decision would still be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. As long as a district court provides a reasoned analysis from 
relevant factors, the appellate court should review only for abuse of discretion. 
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E) Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard218 
Bernard involves the appropriate standard of review for conducting class actions under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(d)219 in a class alleging employment discrimination.220  
Gulf Oil Co. and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission entered into a conciliation 
agreement regarding alleged discrimination at one of its refineries.221  Gulf agreed to cease its 
allegedly discriminatory practices and offered backpay to the alleged victims in exchange for a 
full release of all discrimination claims against it.222  A class action was brought in the district 
court alleging racial discrimination in employment and seeking injunctive, declaratory, and 
monetary relief.223  The named plaintiffs sought to vindicate the alleged rights of the employees 
who were receiving settlement offers.224  
Gulf subsequently filed an order seeking to limit communications with class members by 
parties and their counsel.225  An accompanying brief for Gulf asserted that one of the class 
attorneys recommended that the employees not sign the agreement because they could get at least 
double that amount through the class action.226  The district court then entered a temporary order 
that prohibited all communications to potential or actual class members.227  This order was “not 
based on any findings of fact.”228 
After an oral argument concerning the potential violation of the class members’ First 
Amendment rights in which the district court took no evidence, the district court imposed “a 
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complete ban on all communications concerning the class action between parties or their counsel 
and any actual or potential class member who was not a formal party, without the prior approval 
of the court.”229  This order also came without any findings or fact or written explanation.230  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the court order that limited communications was 
constitutionally permissible.231 
The district court has “both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class 
action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.”232  Rule 23 
requires the district court to balance the importance of class actions with the “opportunities for 
abuse as well as problems for courts and counsel in the management of [class actions].”233  
In Bernard, the district court “failed to provide any record useful for appellate review.”234  
There was no indication of any weighing of competing factors.235  Similarly, “the court made 
neither factual findings nor legal arguments.”236  Instead, the district court adopted “verbatim the 
form of order recommended by the Manual for Complex litigation in the absence of a clear record 
and specific findings of need.”237  The Court found that the lack of careful weighing of competing 
factors significant in finding that the district court had abused its discretion.238  Bernard would 
likely not happen again because district courts are more aware of the importance of the record on 
appeal in light of this case. 
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The Court did not reach the constitutionality of the district court’s order because a court 
must first consider non-constitutional grounds for decision prior to any constitutional questions.239  
In order to grant an order to limit communications, a district court’s determination must be 
“consistent with the general policies embodied in Rule 23.”240  A district court’s determination 
should “be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a 
limitation [on communications] and the potential for interference with the rights of the parties.”241  
Such a determination is the only way to ensure “that the court is furthering, rather than hindering, 
the policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 23.”242 
Since Rule 19(b) is also a mixed question of law and fact that requires a district court to 
balance a number of competing factors, as long as the district court provides a record of its analysis 
of the competing factors, the appellate court should view their conclusion deferentially through 
the abuse of discretion standard.  The absence of any record in Bernard was the result of the district 
court’s assumption that “no particularized weighing of the circumstances of the case was 
necessary” when adopting the order suggested by the Manual for Complex Litigation.243  The 
complete absence of a record on appeal is the exception and not the rule.  As long as the district 
court provides an indication of careful weighing of the competing factors, the circuit court should 
review the district court’s determination for abuse of discretion.  Such a reasoned determination is 
in line with the policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
V. Conclusion 
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The Supreme Court in Pierce noted in the absence of an explicit statutory command or a 
long history of appellate practice, “it is uncommonly difficult to derive from the pattern of 
appellate review of other questions an analytical framework that will yield the correct answer.”244  
Since Pierce was decided, however, the Supreme Court has taken substantial steps forward in 
declaring appellate standards of review.  When one steps back and analyzes the big picture of 
appellate review, mixed questions of law and fact fall into two categories.   
The first category involves mixed questions of law and fact that have constitutional 
considerations.  These cases are justifiably elevated to de novo review because of the importance 
the law-clarifying appellate process.  The second category includes mixed questions of law and 
fact that do not involve constitutional considerations.  Within this second category are legal 
conclusions drawn from Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or legal doctrines concerned with the 
supervision or management of litigation.  The fact-intensive nature of these inquiries demands 
deferential review.  The district court is in a much better position to determine the intricacies of 
the case and manage the litigation before it.   
Rule 19(b), as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, is undeniably implicated in the 
supervision and management of litigation, and it requires the district court to draw a legal 
conclusion by applying the law to the facts.  Consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, Rule 
19(b) warrants abuse of discretion review.   
The Sixth Circuit’s application of de novo review to Rule 19(b) determinations is not 
appropriate.  Applying de novo review simply because a Rule 19(b) determination is a legal 
conclusion is erroneous.  Similarly, elevating the standard of review because the district court’s 
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conclusion may lead to a dismissal is incorrect.  As long as the district court provides a reasoned 
analysis of the competing factors, the appellate court should apply abuse of discretion review.   
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split concerning the appellate review of Rule 
19(b) determinations.  Ideally, the Supreme Court should move beyond making ad hoc 
determinations for mixed questions of law and fact.  Adopting the abuse of discretion standard of 
review for all mixed questions of law and fact would help to harmonize and clarify the appellate 
process. 
